Reform is a process of institutional change and interest redistribution. That of the household registration system is no exception. From the perspective of institutional change

the advancement of reform depends on three aspects. First is the choice for alternative mechanisms or tools. Second is the game of interests between different stakeholders. Third is the search for the opportunity of lower cost. As one of the basic paths to the reform of current household registration system

"additional interest stripping of household registration" is the reform in stock within the institution and reflects the return of institutional concept from instrumental rationality to value rationality. Taking typical policies as examples

such as ration stamp of necessities including grain and oil

employment

social security and housing system

this paper explores the influencing factors and evolution path of the "interest stripping". The research has found that the nature of the interest

stakeholders and their position in the policy network are important variables affecting "interest stripping". There are differences in the degree of interest stripping in different policy areas. To be specific

the closer a field approaches to market economy and the higher the marketization degree this field is

the greater role the market mechanism can play and the higher the stripping degree between Hukou and other interests will be. The farther the field is to market economy

the lower the stripping degree is. A significant differential mode of association is thus unveiled.