Volume 6, Issue 2
1.匹兹堡大学
2.华南师范大学科学技术与社会研究院，广东广州，510006
Published： 30 December 2022 ，
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阿尼尔•古普塔 ,尹维坤.呈现主义：一种基于假设所予的二元经验论[J].认知科学,2022,06(02):244-285.
阿尼尔•古普塔 & 尹维坤. (2022). 呈现主义：一种基于假设所予的二元经验论. Cognitive Scienc, 6(2), 244-285..
阿尼尔•古普塔 ,尹维坤.呈现主义：一种基于假设所予的二元经验论[J].认知科学,2022,06(02):244-285. DOI： 10.12184/wsprzkxWSP2515-528815.20220602.
阿尼尔•古普塔 & 尹维坤. (2022). 呈现主义：一种基于假设所予的二元经验论. Cognitive Scienc, 6(2), 244-285.. DOI： 10.12184/wsprzkxWSP2515-528815.20220602.
本文概述了《意识经验：一种逻辑研究》（哈佛，2019）中详细阐述的经验论。这一经验论的核心观点是经验中的所予——即经验对认知的理性贡献——在性质上是假设性的：经验促成了从主体视角到（例如）知觉信念的合理转换，而不是信念本身的合理性。这一经验论接受这一传统观念，即在经验中，实在的一部分呈现于主体的意识。然而，它拒绝呈现等于亲知的传统等式；经验本身不能使主体有能力知道所呈现事物的任何知识。该理论也拒绝了经验的透明性：经验的现象性特征既不由经验中呈现于意识的事物构成，也不由这些事物决定。现象性特征是由所呈现事物显现于意识的显象构成的。本文认为，显象不是性质，也不是关系属性；它们属于一个非常独特的逻辑范畴。因此，经验有两个组成部分：真实事物的呈现和这些事物显现于主体意识的显象。本文提出的这一经验论的目的是帮助我们更好地理解经验推理和经验辩证。它的用处体现在两个应用上：实指定义和关于颜色性质的本质的争论。结果表明，这一经验论有助于为实指地定义的词项提供一种语义学。本文认为，与其他经验构想相比，这种经验论在探究颜色的本质（以及其他事物的本质）方面提供了更大的理论自由。
呈现主义假设所予显现显象二元经验论
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