A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling

Zihao Ma

doi:10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456924.20250612

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A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling

Volume 6, Issue 12

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A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling
A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling
Beijing National Day School, Beijing, 100039, China
Vol. 6, Issue 12, Pages: 114-118(2025)
Published：30 December 2025
DOI：10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456924.20250612
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Ma Zihao.A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling[J].Theory and Practice of Science and Technology,2025,06(12):114-118.
DOI：

Ma Zihao.A Broader and More Realistic Game: The Defense of Game Concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory and Individual Based Modeling[J].Theory and Practice of Science and Technology,2025,06(12):114-118. DOI： 10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456924.20250612.

摘要

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been controversial on some conceptual issues due to its own interdisciplinary complexity. The philosopher Liu Chuang believes that the concept of "game theory" should be excluded from the evolutionary game theory model in the field of biology. In addition

because of mathematical equivalence

it is pointed out that the Lotka-Volterra equation is more fundamental than the replicator equation. Zhang Mingjun proposed a thin definition of "game theory" and defended the methods of evolutionary game theory. Liu Chuang's argument lacks rigor both in terms of premise and proof process. Liu Chuang's attempt to reduce evolutionary game theory to ecological equations not only fails to solve the definition problem but also complicates the connotation of "evolutionary games." Since game theory always represents the broad and real interactive scenarios in real life

defining the term "game" is not the primary concern. Instead

the legitimacy of the analogical relationship between the model and the interactions of biological individuals in the real world is more critical.

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references

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