Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security

Zewen Wang

doi:10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456932.20260708

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Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security

Volume 7, Issue 8

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Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security
Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security
School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, Heilongjiang, 150001, China
Vol. 7, Issue 8, Pages: 162-167(2026)
Published：30 August 2026
DOI：10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456932.20260708
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Wang Zewen.Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security[J].Theory and Practice of Science and Technology,2026,07(08):162-167.
DOI：

Wang Zewen.Kyber and Dilithium Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of Performance and Security[J].Theory and Practice of Science and Technology,2026,07(08):162-167. DOI： 10.47297/taposatWSP2633-456932.20260708.

摘要

Abstract

Quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional public-key cryptographic systems such as RSA and ECC. Shor's algorithm solves integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time

whereas Grover's algorithm reduces the effective key length of symmetric schemes. In addition

the "harvest-now-decrypt-later" threat further necessitates the deployment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC). In 2024

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released FIPS 203 and FIPS 204

standardizing ML-KEM and ML-DSA as module-lattice-based key encapsulation and digital signature algorithms

respectively. However

existing studies mainly focus on individual algorithms and lack systematic comparisons across multiple dimensions. This paper reviews the evolution of quantum security threats and PQC development

analyzes the security foundations and structural differences between Ring-LWE and Module-LWE

and examines the architectures

standardized parameters

and implementation characteristics of ML-KEM and ML-DSA. Performance differences are evaluated in terms of storage overhead

computational cost

and communication bandwidth. Furthermore

this study summarizes engineering challenges through global migration strategies and practical deployment cases. The results confirm that both algorithms offer provable post-quantum security

while ML-DSA introduces significantly larger signature sizes and higher computational costs

limiting its deployment in resource-constrained scenarios such as IoT and narrowband communication systems. This work provides theoretical guidance for post-quantum migration in 5G and IoT infrastructures

and supports the selection of lattice-based cryptographic solutions for practical deployment.

关键词

Keywords

references

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