Ammalainen A., & Moroshkina N. (2021). The effect of true and false unreportable hints on anagram problem solving, restructuring, and the Aha!-experience. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 33(6–7), 644–658. https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2020.1844722

Bangu S. (2021). Mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4), 669–682. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1822895

Baumberger C., Beisbart C., & Brun G. (2017). What is scientific understanding? An overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. In S. R. Grimm, C. Baumberger, & S. Ammon (Eds.), Explaining understanding: New perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science (pp. 1–34). Routledge-Taylor & Francis.

Bueno O., & Colyvan M. (2011). An inferential conception of the application of mathematics. Noûs, 45(2), 345–374. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00772.x

de Regt H. W. (2017). Understanding scientific understanding. Oxford University Press.

Dellsén F. (2020). Beyond explanation: Understanding as dependency modelling. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(4), 1261–1286. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy058

Dutilh Novaes C. (2020). The dialogical roots of deduction: Historical, cognitive, and philosophical perspectives on reasoning. Cambridge University Press.

Elgin C. Z. (2017). True enough. MIT Press.

Grimmer H., Laukkonen R., Tangen J., & Von Hippel W. (2022). Eliciting false insights with semantic priming. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 29(3), 954–970. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-02049-x

Hardcastle, G. (n.d.). A problem-solving account of scientific explanation [Manuscript]. https://philpapers.org/archive/HARAPA-7.pdf

Hempel C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. The Free Press.

Keil F. C. (2006). Explanation and understanding. Annu Rev Psychol. 57, 227-254. https://doi.org/10.1146%2Fannurev.psych.57.102904.190100

Khalifa K. (2013). The role of explanation in understanding. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(1), 161–187. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr057

Khalifa K. (2017). Understanding, explanation, and scientific knowledge (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108164276

Khalifa K. (2023). Should friends and frenemies of understanding be friends? Discussing de Regt. In I. Lawler, K. Khalifa, & E. Shech (Eds.), Scientific understanding and representation: Modeling in the physical sciences (pp. 33–50). Routledge.

Kitcher P. (1989). Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 13) (pp. 410–505). University of Minnesota Press.

Kounios J., & Beeman M. (2014). The cognitive neuroscience of insight. Annual Review of Psychology, 65(1), 71–93. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115154

Kvanvig J. L. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge University Press.

Lange M. (2013). What makes a scientific explanation distinctively mathematical? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(3), 485–511. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs012

Lange M. (2018). A reply to Craver and Povich on the directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 67, 85–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.002

Mantzavinos C. (2016). Explanatory pluralism. Cambridge university press.

Salvi C., Bricolo E., Kounios J., Bowden E., & Beeman M. (2016). Insight solutions are correct more often than analytic solutions. Thinking & Reasoning, 22(4), 443–460. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2016.1141798

Schultz P. W., & Searleman A. (2002). Rigidity of thought and behavior: 100 years of research. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 128(2), 165–207.

van Fraassen, Bas. C. (1980). The scientific image (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001