Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism

Xiaoyang Wang; Yucheng W Wang

doi:10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20200402

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Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism

Issue 2

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Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism
Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism
Department of philosophy Xiamen Fujian361005
Lecturer of Xidian University, Xi'an Shaanxi710018
Issue 2, Pages: 53-67(2020)
Published： 30 December 2020 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20200402
Accepted：

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XIAOYANG WANG & YUCHENG W WANG. (2020). Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism. Critical Theory, (2), 53-67..
DOI：

XIAOYANG WANG & YUCHENG W WANG. (2020). Mental Causation, Exclusive Argument, and Non-reductive Physicalism. Critical Theory, (2), 53-67.. DOI： 10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20200402.

摘要

Abstract

Jeagwon Kim's exclusion argument is a well-known argument against non-reductive physicalism in the contemporary debate on mental causation. In this essay

we will first discuss two versions of the exclusion argument: the simple version and the sophisticated version. Secondly

we will take a conservative strategy to defend the kind of non-reductive physicalism initiated by Donald Davidson: the Token Identity Theory. Namely

we will explain where Kim failed to appropriately understand Davidson's work and argue that the simple version and the sophisticated version of the exclusion argument won't work against the clarified token identity theory at all. Lastly

Since much of Kim's inappropriate interpretation of Davidson's work is rooted in their difference in metaphysics

there is reason to believe the proper understanding and evaluation on contemplation as such on mental causation

non-reductive physicalism

and other related problems can't be achieved without finding an appropriate metaphysical frame.

关键词

Keywords

Mental causationExclusion argumentNon-reductive physicalismToken identity theoryPhilosophy of mind

references

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