Incomplete contract nature of the implementation of food safety guarantee right and its supervision involution

Deyu Zhao; Bo Tang

doi:10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471001.20240801

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Incomplete contract nature of the implementation of food safety guarantee right and its supervision involution

Volume 8, Issue 1

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Incomplete contract nature of the implementation of food safety guarantee right and its supervision involution
School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University,200433
Vol. 8, Issue 1, Pages: 5-28(2024)
Published： 30 June 2024 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471001.20240801

Full txt

Zhao Deyu,Tang Bo.Incomplete contract nature of the implementation of food safety guarantee right and its supervision involution[J].Social Policy Review,2024,08(01):5-28.
DOI：

Zhao Deyu,Tang Bo.Incomplete contract nature of the implementation of food safety guarantee right and its supervision involution[J].Social Policy Review,2024,08(01):5-28. DOI： 10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471001.20240801.

摘要

Abstract

Incomplete contract theory is often used for economic analysis of property rights

but the analysis of social rights such as the right to food safety is relatively lacking. This article from the utilitarianism

Rawls contract theory and Nozick extreme rights doctrine to food security right for normative analysis

discussed in different theoretical paradigm perspective of food security right connotation. Based on this

through the incomplete contractual relationship among producers

consumers and regulators

this paper makes an empirical analysis of the implementation cost of the right to food safety

and finds that government regulators bear the high implementation cost of the right to food safety

and "regulatory involution" has become a rational choice for regulators. However

"involution" investment is not a long-term solution. Therefore

the return of market subject responsibility

the standardization and traceability of market transaction process and the strict inspection of products before entering the market have become effective choices for food safety guarantee.

关键词

Keywords

Food safety guarantee rightIncomplete contractNormative analysisRegulatory involutionImplementation cost

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