The Incomplete Contractual Nature of the Implementation of the Right to Food Safety Guarantee and its Regulatory Involution

Deyu Zhao; Bo Tang

doi:10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471004.20240801

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The Incomplete Contractual Nature of the Implementation of the Right to Food Safety Guarantee and its Regulatory Involution

Volume 8, Issue 1

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The Incomplete Contractual Nature of the Implementation of the Right to Food Safety Guarantee and its Regulatory Involution
School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University, 200433
Vol. 8, Issue 1, Pages: 53-77(2024)
Published： 30 June 2024 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471004.20240801
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Zhao Deyu,Tang Bo.The Incomplete Contractual Nature of the Implementation of the Right to Food Safety Guarantee and its Regulatory Involution[J].Social Policy Review,2024,08(01):53-77.
DOI：

Zhao Deyu,Tang Bo.The Incomplete Contractual Nature of the Implementation of the Right to Food Safety Guarantee and its Regulatory Involution[J].Social Policy Review,2024,08(01):53-77. DOI： 10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471004.20240801.

摘要

Abstract

Incomplete contract theory is often used for economic analysis of property rights

but there is a lack of analysis and research on social rights such as the right to food safety guarantee. This paper makes a normative analysis of the right to food safety guarantee from utilitarianism

Rawls's contract theory to Nozick's extreme rightsism

and discusses the connotation of the right to food safety guarantee from the perspective of different theoretical paradigms. Based on this

through the incomplete contractual relationship between producers

consumers and regulators

this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the implementation cost of right to food safety guarantee

and finds that government regulators are burdened with high implementation costs of right to food safety guarantee

and "regulatory involution" has become a rational choice for regulators. However

"involution" investment is not a long-term solution. Therefore

the return of the responsibility of market entities

the standardization and traceability of the market transaction process

and the strict testing of products before entering the market have become effective choices for food safety guarantee.

关键词

Keywords

Incomplete ContractNormative AnalysisRegulatory InvolutionImplementation Cost

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