Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System

Hua Wang

doi:10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471005.20210501

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Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System

Volume 5, Issue 1

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Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System
Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System
Department of Sociology, East China University of Science and Technology, Xuhui District, Meilong 130 Street, 200231 Shanghai, China
Vol. 5, Issue 1, Pages: 70-78(2021)
Published： 30 June 2021 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471005.20210501
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Hua Wang.Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System[J].Social Policy Review,2021,05(01):70-78.
DOI：

Hua Wang.Moral Hazard and Welfare Losses Embedded in the Framework of the Medical Insurance System[J].Social Policy Review,2021,05(01):70-78. DOI： 10.47297/wspsprwWSP2515-471005.20210501.

摘要

Abstract

As a significant factor that erodes the overall provision of health insurance benefits

moral hazard is essentially an opportunistic behavior embedded within the framework of the health insurance system. The occurrence of moral hazard in the field of health insurance is influenced by specific economic and social conditions and is also highly causally related to certain institutional structures. The widespread presence of moral hazard not only results in the marginal benefits of medical services being far lower than their marginal costs but also objectively leads to serious welfare losses in healthcare security.

关键词

Keywords

Medical insuranceMoral hazardWelfare lossesHealthcare social policy

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