9卷 第2期
虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系
虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系
- 2025年9卷第2期 页码:45-54
纸质出版:2025-12-30
DOI:10.12184/wsprzkxWSP2515-528805.20250902
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9卷 第2期
西北大学哲学学院,陕西 西安 710127
纸质出版:2025-12-30
Scan QR Code
马芳芳.虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系[J].认知科学,2025,09(02):45-54.
马芳芳. (2025). 虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系. Cognitive Scienc, 9(2), 45-54..
马芳芳.虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系[J].认知科学,2025,09(02):45-54. DOI: 10.12184/wsprzkxWSP2515-528805.20250902.
马芳芳. (2025). 虚假的对立——论现象概念和私人语言的内在关系. Cognitive Scienc, 9(2), 45-54.. DOI: 10.12184/wsprzkxWSP2515-528805.20250902.
当代关于现象概念和私人语言之间关系的讨论主要有激进立场和温和立场两种不同解读。前者认为存在原则上不可表达的纯粹现象概念;后者承认现象概念是可表达的,但是用来表达现象概念的语词具有私人性,它们是内省识别模式下有意义的私人语言。然而,纯粹现象概念在公共语言背景下或者沦为无意义的声音、或者转变为公共语言;这些语词的私人性也可以通过私人语言和个人语言的区分得到修正;内省识别模式凭借引用模型最终敞现为经验主体的自我归属能力。由此,现象概念最终并不会导向某种私人语言。
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