Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems

Mochen Zhang

doi:10.47297/wspceWSP2516-251905.20230702

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Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems

7卷第2期

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Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems
Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems
School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo Zhejiang 315199, P. R. China
2023年7卷第2期页码：50-55
纸质出版日期： 2023-04-25 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspceWSP2516-251905.20230702

Full txt

(2023). Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems. 创意经济（英文版）, 7(2), 50-55.

Zhang Mochen.Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems[J].Creative Economy,2023,07(02):50-55.
(2023). Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems. 创意经济（英文版）, 7(2), 50-55. DOI： 10.47297/wspceWSP2516-251905.20230702.

Zhang Mochen.Dynamic game analysis in multiple marginalization problems[J].Creative Economy,2023,07(02):50-55. DOI： 10.47297/wspceWSP2516-251905.20230702.

摘要

Abstract

In an industry

there are often upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises

if they choose to cooperate in production

then different degrees of double marginalization is inevitable. In the process of this dynamic game

different enterprises need to decide whether to participate in cooperative production or how to share to maximize benefits according to different situations. If the loss caused by double marginalization is too high

the company can choose to complete the industrial chain alone without cooperation. Similarly

different sharing decisions can be used in cooperation to mitigate the loss of double marginalization.

关键词

Keywords

Double marginalizationLinear pricingFix percentage

references

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