As green consumption becomes a mainstream market trend

certain green-focused enterprises

led by Tesla

have begun implementing differentiated pricing strategies

prompting theoretical reflections on the compatibility between price discrimination and green strategy. This paper integrates theories of green supply chain pricing and price discrimination

constructing a Stackelberg game model involving two competing manufacturers and a common retailer to explore the logical relationships underlying green enterprises' price discrimination. The study reveals that price discrimination and green pricing are indeed theoretically compatible

as the differentiated premium generated by green investment provides a foundation for implementing price discrimination. Tesla's strategy of "lowering prices in China while raising them in North America" is endogenous to the strategic choices of green enterprises

reflecting strategic variations across different market stages. The optimal investment decision for manufacturers depends on the interplay among spillover effects

investment efficiency

and product substitutability

resulting in three equilibrium outcomes: bilateral investment

unilateral investment

and no investment. Moreover

the retailer consistently benefits from manufacturers' green investments. In summary

this research offers a new theoretical perspective for understanding pricing behavior and investment decisions within the green supply chain.