China's arbitration law has long been built upon an institution-centred model. Under the former Arbitration Law

a valid arbitration agreement generally had to contain not only the parties' intention to arbitrate and the matters submitted to arbitration

but also a selected arbitration commission. This requirement created a structural obstacle for ad hoc arbitration

because ad hoc arbitration is defined precisely by the absence of continuous institutional administration. The result was a tension between Chinese domestic law and the expectations of international commercial arbitration

especially where contracts referred to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules

a foreign seat

or a tribunal constituted by party appointment. The 2025 revision of the Arbitration Law

effective on 1 March 2026

does not completely abandon the institutional orientation of Chinese arbitration. Articles 27 and 29 still retain the general requirement of a selected arbitration institution and the invalidity consequence where an unclear institutional designation is not supplemented. Nevertheless

Article 82 introduces a limited statutory channel for ad hoc arbitration in foreign-related maritime disputes and in certain foreign-related disputes between enterprises registered in free trade zones

the Hainan Free Trade Port

and other state-designated areas. This paper argues that the reform marks a cautious transition from absolute institutional monopoly to controlled rule-based party autonomy. China should further develop a coherent validity regime that respects genuine arbitration consent while preserving procedural predictability

judicial supervision

institutional assistance

and international enforceability.