Environmental public interest litigation serves as the core judicial mechanism for remedying ecological public interests. Standing

as the threshold for initiating litigation

directly determines the effectiveness of judicial protection for environmental public interests. Drawing on federal environmental statutes and the "actual injury" doctrine established through case law

the United States has built a multi-party plaintiff system consisting of citizens

environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and administrative authorities. By contrast

China's legislation has set up a dual statutory plaintiff model of qualified environmental social organizations and procuratorial organs

while completely denying individual citizens the right to file environmental public interest litigation. The two systems differ markedly in standing criteria

scope of eligible plaintiffs and pre-litigation procedures. Through a comparative analysis of statutory norms and judicial practices between China and the U.S.

this paper dissects the respective merits

demerits and root causes of such institutional divergences. Based on China's administration-led environmental governance model and civil law tradition

this paper selectively absorbs mature institutional experience from the U.S. and proposes localized reform approaches from four dimensions: expanding eligible plaintiffs

unifying pre-litigation procedures

optimizing standing rules and improving supporting mechanisms. It intends to provide references for the codification of the Environmental Code and the revision of rules governing environmental public interest litigation.