Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia

Huiming Ren

doi:10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469901.20240801

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Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia

8卷第1期

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Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia
Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia
Shandong University Qingdao Campus, Institute of Philosophy of Mind
2024年8卷第1期页码：3-21
纸质出版日期： 2024-06-30 ，
DOI：10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469901.20240801
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(2024). Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia. 认知科学（英文版）, 8(1), 3-21.

Ren Huiming.Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia[J].Journal of Human Cognition,2024,08(01):3-21.
(2024). Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia. 认知科学（英文版）, 8(1), 3-21. DOI： 10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469901.20240801.

Ren Huiming.Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia[J].Journal of Human Cognition,2024,08(01):3-21. DOI： 10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469901.20240801.

摘要

Abstract

It is first shown that many questions could be raised about phenomenal concepts and the popular answer to the question what Mary learns upon release

namely

that

this

is what it is like to see red. It is then shown that the category of quale is actually a postulate of philosophical theories and philosophers posit qualia because they fail to see how to account for the two related features of experience

namely

subjectivity and phenomenality. It is argued that we don't need qualia to explain the subjectivity and phenomenality of experience because we don't have to posit apparent properties. It is then proposed that experiencing is a way of knowing and that the new knowledge Mary acquires upon release is her knowledge by acquaintance with red.

关键词

Keywords

qualiaphenomenal conceptssense-data theoryapparent propertiesrepresentationalismknowledge by acquaintance

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